Maybe this idea could be understood in a particularist meaning so that it acts as justification to a sociological theory of meaning. In a certain way, Wittgenstein seems to support this interpretation, and his vision about the existence of different images of the world would do no other thing than justify it.
If we analyse the word mythology we can see the close relationship Wittgenstein establishes between language and action. How we understand meaning, which meaning we give to something, is only evident in the use of words and sentences. The best way of perceiving it is seeing where we can place them in our life. Some sentences acquire a certain importance in relation to the rest and end up becoming an axis due to the relationship that the rest establish with them within the language game.
The intention of Moore when he proposed this kind of statement was to appeal to those elements of common sense from which he could emphasise the mistakes of scepticism. That is, it is intrinsic to the language game to possess sentences which we cannot doubt about, and this converts them into sentences of a rigidity which is fundamental to the structure of the game itself. Its consistency depends on those elements from whose conjunction derive what we called mythology.
What does it mean not to doubt about them and to what extent are they indubitable? In his reflections about Moore, Wittgenstein accepts certain estimations; especially the mistake of scepticism —basically, radical scepticism- which would give rise to propose an indefinite process of doubt. This argumentative process cannot be given up and it is important to the extent that we are unravelling the value of the linguistic uses as a linguistic action at the same time.
When we affirm that we know something it is supposed that we are able to give reasons for it; or at least it is intelligible to provide support for it. We think that it is impossible to admit evidence against it.
But we have to be able to give reasons to justify our degree of clarity security. Wittgenstein expresses it with determination when he affirms:. Whether someone knows something can come to light, assuming that he is convinced of it. Those statements that Moore is talking about are the ones that we cannot give reasons for. They should be self-evident, but also be basic elements in the exercise of common sense.
This study Wittgenstein makes about this type of statements is singularly interesting and important because it shows us how a language-game works. Although the ambiguity of this term is well known, we are going to talk about it in a generic way. Wittgenstein affirms that the language game relies on securities unquestionable reliances. And he does it that way because if not, the constitution of meaning —the stability upon which it is based- would disappear.
That is, a constancy of basic elements is needed to allow the combination and exercise of the different concrete uses. What is true is that the quality of stability of such elements depends on the very interaction between the statements, that is, it is not given in an a priori way or essentially. The latter depends on the former, but the meaningful existence of both comes from their interdependency, that is, the way the uses are intersected.
But the language game relies on other securities. For example, on the confidence that someone who is learning it —consciously or not- has in the one who is teaching it. Language is a mere reaction [i] , but we also need to learn to react, that is, to learn to articulate meaning, making present the rules which characterise it through the coincidence with what others say. Even though confidence may not seem very philosophical it is, nevertheless, necessary and is the way in which we assimilate meaning.
We learn to recognise something meaningful thanks to our security in the interaction in which we are engaged.
If doubt were our natural state it would not support the process of production and interchange of meaning, so having it as an attitude would prevent a child believing in something, and this is contradictory by definition. We cannot begin with doubt. It comes after a certainty, which whatever it might be, is in a close relation with the security which we manifest in the confidence given to those with whom we interact. A security that we could call irrational is the foundation through which learning is produced; but it itself lacks a foundation. It is given. The difficulty, if it is so, is that these securities are the ones which lead us to assimilate the interconnection in mythology.
That is, we learn connection between statements at the same time that we learn the way terms are used which allows us to do a significant transfer with those who surround us.
The public and social character of language prevents us to do so. As coincidence in language is a fact —and it is given as a proper action- the meanings represent what they represent, but because of the social character itself of this coincidence, we cannot obviate the presence of particular models of coincidence, i. When we learn language, then, we are taught how to act in relation to the way in which from our own setting, meaning shows reality in all its dimensions. This approximation to the problem could lead us to a position which could descend to relativism.
The process of conformation of meaning could be understood from the perspective of so many mythologies deriving from as many culturally determined accesses to the reality that there could be. The image of the world we have relies on such mythology cf. The introduction of the concept of riverbed or streambed becomes something fundamental here, as it clearly exemplifies the way in which mythology as a concept as well as its proper functioning must be understood.
There are certain statements which, although they appear to be empirical statements, actually they are not, or at least that is not their role. What is the mystery enclosed in this presumed relationship between appearance and reality? What is Wittgenstein referring to when he talks about the step from empirical to grammatical? In his Philosophical Investigations Wittgenstein talks about grammar especially to refer to the rules that constitute language. Together with this, we are shown the function we can give to a word, and we have the place it must occupy.
How it occupies the places is what we call manifestations of a rule in its use, showing us how we have learnt the language. In this learning, we are presented with the ways of using words, and also the relationship between them, and their different uses. It is here, to our understanding, that the distinction between empirical and grammatical sentences is retaken.
The logical status of each type is different, and with it, its role in language. To understand this, Wittgenstein introduced his metaphor of the riverbed cf. The non-static vision Wittgenstein has of meaning leads us to understand the importance of linguistic action as action. Does it mean that there is no steady meaning? The answer is obviously that there is.
In this important study Ernst Cassirer analyzes the non-rational thought processes that go to make up culture. He demonstrates that beneath both language and myth there lies an unconscious "grammar" of experience, whose categories and canons are. Language and Myth Paperback – June 1, In this important study Ernst Cassirer analyzes the non-rational thought processes that go to make up culture. He demonstrates that beneath both language and myth there lies an unconscious "grammar" of experience, whose categories and.
Meaning cannot exist without the security within the linguistic action, that is, only regularities and a logical connection between them allows language to fulfil its functions. We could imagine that the stream of meaning could provoke variation within different moments in the language game. We could imagine it to the extent that these moments could be distinguished by a rigid separation. This could be, perhaps, the point of view of Th. Kuhn and P.
Feyerabend when they talk about incommensurability between paradigms. If Wittgenstein is referring to a change in the language game, we would be close to the problem of meaning created by the change of paradigms. At least, if we are talking about a sequence of paradigms, the effect could be of a confrontation or competition which had to be decided by the imposition of one over the other. If the change is between one and another —let us consider them in parallel- the situation would not be so radical.
It is true that the use changes the role of a word, but it does not need to vary radically. They can have connections, some family resemblances.
We should clarify this a bit. If, in the end, what it is all about is a change inside the language game, a modification of the meaning when insisting on some aspects instead of others, the fluidity meed not negate the consistency of the game itself.